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NOTES 
HOW TO EXPLAIN TO YOUR TWINS WHY ONLY 
ONE CAN BE AMERICAN:  THE RIGHT TO 
CITIZENSHIP OF CHILDREN BORN TO SAME-
SEX COUPLES THROUGH ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Lena K. Bruce* 
 
Sections 301 and 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) govern 
birthright citizenship by descent.  Per the U.S. Department of State’s (DOS) 
interpretation of these sections, to transmit citizenship to a child, the U.S. 
citizen-parent must have a biological connection with the child.  For couples 
who use assisted reproductive technology (ART) to have children, however, 
this means that one parent will always be barred from transmitting 
citizenship to their own child.  This is because in ART families, at least one 
parent will always lack the biological connection that the DOS requires to 
transmit citizenship pursuant to the INA.  This policy disproportionately 
affects same-sex couples since same-sex couples who choose not to adopt 
rely almost exclusively on ART to have children. 
Further, even if the citizen-parent is able to establish a biological 
connection, the children of married same-sex couples are categorically 
considered born out of wedlock and therefore subjected to significantly 
harsher citizenship requirements. 
The DOS’s interpretation of the INA raises serious concerns about the 
protection of same-sex couples’ constitutional rights.  It also prompts policy 
questions about the importance of biology versus intent in determining 
parentage.  This Note argues that the effects of the DOS’s interpretation on 
same-sex couples can be counteracted through a dual approach.  First, 
Congress must amend the INA to recognize intent-based parentage.  Second, 
until Congress passes such an amendment, federal courts and state 
legislators must collaborate to protect the rights of same-sex parents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Andrew and Elad met at a holiday party.1  After two years of dating, they 
got married.2  After five years of marriage, they decided it was time to grow 
their family.3  As a same-sex couple, they turned to assisted reproductive 
technology (ART) for help.4 
ART is used to have children without relying on the reproductive organs 
of the parents.5  It includes all fertility treatments in which eggs or embryos 
are handled outside the body to induce pregnancy.6  The two most common 
ART procedures are artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization.7  In 
artificial insemination, sperm is introduced into the female reproductive 
system via injection, while during in vitro fertilization, eggs are surgically 
removed, combined with sperm in a laboratory, and returned to the woman’s 
uterus.8  ART procedures also often require donated eggs or sperm and a 
gestational surrogate.9 
ART is shattering traditional conceptions about what a family “should” 
look like.10  Through ART, a child can have up to five “parents”:  the sperm 
donor, the egg donor, the surrogate, and two nonbiologically related 
individuals who intend to raise the child.11  Even the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized that, today, the “average American family” is difficult to define 
since the composition of each family can greatly vary.12 
 
 1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11, Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 
2:18-cv-00523, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30525 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Dvash-
Banks Complaint]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 2. 
 5. JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 1 (2d ed. 2013). 
 6. Id. at 7. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Assisted Reproductive Technologies, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., 
https://www.sart.org/patients/a-patients-guide-to-assisted-reproductive-technology/general-
information/assisted-reproductive-technologies/ [https://perma.cc/7HG7-SBSP] (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2019).  There are two types of surrogacy:  traditional surrogates are themselves 
artificially inseminated, either by the intended father or an anonymous donor, and carry the 
baby to term. Overview of the Surrogacy Process, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, 
https://www.hrc.org/resources/overview-of-the-surrogacy-process [https://perma.cc/VTM4-
BF7H] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  In comparison, gestational surrogates carry babies that 
were conceived by fertilizing the egg of the intended mother (or anonymous donor) with the 
sperm of the intended father (or anonymous donor) in a laboratory. Id. 
 10. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”?:  The Claims of 
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 355 (1991). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).  While the U.S. Supreme Court was 
speaking in reference to the role of grandparents in single-parent households, the logic of 
Troxel equally applies in the context of ART. 
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The use of ART has doubled over the past decade.13  Same-sex couples, in 
particular, increasingly rely on ART to have children.14  Andrew and Elad 
Dvash-Banks are one of these couples.15  They used ART to source 
anonymous donor eggs and fertilize the eggs with their separate sperm.16  The 
resulting embryos were then implanted into a gestational surrogate17 and, 
finally, in September 2016, Andrew and Elad became proud parents to twin 
boys—Aiden and Ethan.18 
After the birth of their children, the couple decided to move from Canada, 
where the twins were born, to California, to be near Andrew’s family.19  In 
doing so, however, the Dvash-Banks family encountered a problem:  Aiden 
entered the country with his American passport.20  Ethan, his twin, had to 
apply for a tourist visa.21 
The reason for the different treatment is “the nationality of the sperm” that 
was used to conceive each child.22  Andrew is an American citizen while 
Elad is Israeli.23  When the couple sought recognition of their twins’ U.S. 
citizenship, the U.S. consular official in Toronto asked them to submit a DNA 
test to prove that each child was biologically related to the American parent.24  
The result showed, however, that Aiden was conceived with Andrew’s sperm 
and Ethan with that of Elad.25  Since Ethan is not biologically related to the 
American parent, the Department of State (DOS), through the consulate, 
denied him citizenship.26 
In January 2018, Andrew filed a lawsuit in the Central District of 
California, on behalf of himself and Ethan, challenging this decision.27  
Among other requests, he asked to be recognized as Ethan’s parent and, as a 
result, for Ethan to be declared a U.S. citizen.28 
The Dvash-Banks family’s plight exemplifies the bewildering intersection 
of ART and citizenship law.  “ART children” like Ethan and Aiden almost 
always lack a genetic or gestational relationship with at least one of their 
 
 13. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html [https://perma.cc/UN2V-RGTP] 
(last updated Sept. 10, 2019). 
 14. Scott Titshaw, A Modest Proposal to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens, & etc.:  
Immigration Law, the Defense of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 25 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 420 (2011). 
 15. See Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 5, 15. 
 20. Id. at 15. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 13; Titshaw, supra note 14, at 422. 
 23. Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
 24. Id. at 13. 
 25. Id. at 2. 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. Id. at 1, 5. 
 28. Id. at 24. 
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intended parents.29  However, per its interpretation of the relevant provisions 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the DOS does not recognize 
a parent-child relationship unless there is such a biological30 connection.31 
An immediate consequence of this biology-based policy is that the DOS 
does not recognize the birthright citizenship of many ART children, like 
Ethan.32  The interpretation makes citizenship transmission dramatically 
difficult not only by prohibiting “merely” an intended parent from 
transmitting citizenship but also by positing that a biological parent-child 
connection is only the threshold, not the rule, to transmit citizenship.33  In 
other words, even if the parent establishes a biological relationship with the 
child, the parent only becomes eligible to transmit citizenship.34  Whether 
citizenship is actually transmitted further depends on meeting certain criteria 
set out in the INA.35 
The INA provides two alternative routes for a parent to transmit 
citizenship.  INA section 301 outlines the criteria for transmitting citizenship 
to children born in wedlock.36  INA section 309 does the same for children 
born out of wedlock.37  The criteria under section 309 are significantly harder 
to satisfy than those under section 301.38  Yet, in deciding which children are 
born in wedlock, biology is once again determinative:  per the DOS’s 
interpretation of the INA, a child is considered born in wedlock only if his or 
her biological parents are married; it is not enough for the intended parents 
to be married.39 
With one marginal exception applicable to certain lesbian parents, 
however, the biological parents of a same-sex couples’ ART child will never 
be married.40  This means that the ART children of essentially all same-sex 
couples are categorically born out of wedlock, even if their intended parents 
are married.41  This is particularly alarming since same-sex couples who 
choose not to adopt rely exclusively on ART to have children.42 
 
 29. AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION WITH REPORT NO. 113, at 1 (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/ebook-of-
resolutions-with-reports/2017-hod-midyear-electronic-report-book.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X8AL-B596] [hereinafter ABA RESOLUTION 113]. 
 30. This Note uses the term “biological” to encompass both genetic and gestational 
relationships. 
 31. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 32. See infra Parts I.B.2, II.B.2. 
 33. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 34. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 35. See infra Parts I.A.1–2. 
 36. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012). 
 37. Id. § 1409. 
 38. See Ashley D. Craythorne, Note, Same-Sex Equality in Immigration Law:  The Case 
for Birthright Citizenship for Foreign-Born Children of U.S. Citizens in Same-Sex Binational 
Unions, 97 TEX. L. REV. 645, 663 (2019).  Compare id., with INA § 1401. 
 39. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 40. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 41. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 42. See Michael J. Higdon, Biological Citizenship and the Children of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 124, 168 (2019).  LGBTQ couples in which one partner is 
transgender may provide an exception to this statement if the transgender partner retains the 
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“Citizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have 
rights.”43  The DOS’s denial of this vital right based on a narrow reading of 
the INA raises serious concerns.44  First and foremost, the DOS policy’s 
effect on same-sex couples prompts questions about the constitutionality of 
the practice45 in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions United States v. 
Windsor,46 Obergefell v. Hodges,47 and Pavan v. Smith.48  Further, the policy 
is controversial for its rigid emphasis on biology-based parentage, which 
appears antithetical to the congressionally established purpose of the INA to 
protect family unity.49 
To provide a tailored analysis of and potential solution to DOS’s 
interpretation of the INA, this Note focuses on (1) the birthright citizenship 
of (2) ART children (3) who are born abroad (4) to same-sex parents, (5) only 
one of whom is a U.S. citizen.  Part I provides an overview of birthright 
citizenship with a specific focus on the right to citizenship of children born 
abroad, as governed by the INA.  Part I also details the DOS’s interpretation 
of the INA and its effects on same-sex couples’ ability to transmit citizenship 
to their ART children.  Part II discusses the assorted concerns raised by 
DOS’s biology-based interpretation, including questions concerning same-
sex couples’ constitutional rights.  Part III concludes by proposing a dual 
approach to counteract the effects of the DOS’s policy on same-sex parents.  
The dual approach consists of, first, congressional amendment of the INA 
and, second, collaboration between state legislatures and the federal 
judiciary. 
I.  BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP OF CHILDREN BORN ABROAD THROUGH 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
For many, citizenship is an ingredient of identity just as family, language, 
and ethnicity are.50  For all, citizenship is a vessel that brings with it a set of 
 
biological traits of the gender with which they do not identify, allowing for traditional 
procreation. See, e.g., Jackie Molloy & Denise Grady, A Family in Transition, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/health/transgender-baby.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4K9L-HJNY] (telling the story of two fathers, one of whom gave birth to their 
daughter). 
 43. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).  In Perez, the 
Supreme Court held that it was within Congress’s power to strip an American citizen of 
citizenship if the citizen acted in certain ways. Id. at 62 (majority opinion).  Justices Hugo 
Black and William O. Douglas, dissented, arguing that “[t]he power of Congress to withhold 
[citizenship], modify it, or cancel it does not exist.” Id. at 84 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Nine 
years later, the Court overruled its Perez decision in Afroyim v. Rusk, explicitly stating, “we 
agree with the . . . dissent in the Perez case that the Government is without power to rob a 
citizen of his citizenship.” 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967).  Through this ruling, the Court 
emphasized the unassailable value of citizenship. See id. 
 44. See infra Part II. 
 45. See infra Part II.A. 
 46. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 47. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 48. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 49. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 50. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
LAW AND POLICY 1345 (6th ed. 2015). 
2019] ONLY ONE CAN BE AMERICAN 1005 
incomparable rights.51  The decision to grant or deny citizenship can be life 
altering.52  The INA outlines, among many other things, the requirements for 
children born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent to obtain birthright citizenship.53  
The authority to interpret these provisions of the INA to make a decision 
about the “nationality of a person not in the United States” lies with the 
DOS.54 
Part I.A provides a limited overview of citizenship by discussing the two 
kinds of birthright citizenship as they are presented in the Constitution and 
the INA.  Part I.B discusses the importance of the parent-child relationship 
to birthright citizenship as a segue into the DOS’s interpretation of the INA, 
which is central to this Note. 
A.  Birthright Citizenship Under the INA 
There are “two sources of citizenship, and two only:  birth and 
naturalization.”55  Or, in other words, citizenship acquired at birth and 
citizenship acquired after birth.56  Citizenship acquired at birth (or birthright 
citizenship), in turn, is based on one of two principles:  jus soli (“right of the 
land”) or jus sanguinis (“right of the blood”).57 
Jus soli uses a person’s birthplace to determine citizenshipit “confers a 
nation’s citizenship on persons born within that nation’s territory.”58  The 
United States has adopted the jus soli principle in the Citizenship Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, according to which anyone can become a U.S. 
citizen solely by virtue of being born on U.S. soil.59 
In contrast, jus sanguinis (also known as “citizenship by descent”)60 
prescribes that the parents’ citizenship determines the child’s citizenship, 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 
629, 631 (2014). 
 53. INA §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012). 
 54. Id. § 1104(a); Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) and Surrogacy Abroad, U.S. 
DEP’T ST., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/us-
citizenship/Assisted-Reproductive-Technology-ART-Surrogacy-Abroad.html 
[https://perma.cc/BRN4-6H82] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 55. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898).  “Naturalization is the 
process by which U.S. citizenship is granted to a foreign citizen or national after he or she 
fulfills the requirements established by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA).” Citizenship Through Naturalization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization [https://perma.cc/ 
X8XD-FD7C] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  The effects of naturalization on the citizenship of 
ART children is outside the scope of this Note. 
 56. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 50, at 1263. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.; see also Michael G. McFarland, Note, Derivative Citizenship:  Its History, 
Constitutional Foundation, and Constitutional Limitations, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
467, 471 (2008) (stating that “any child born within the borders of a state becomes a citizen 
of that state”). 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (declaring that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the 
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside”). 
 60. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 50, at 1263. 
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regardless of where the child is born.61  As such, jus sanguinis governs the 
citizenship of children born outside the United States to one or more U.S. 
citizens.62  Unlike jus soli, jus sanguinis is not protected by the Constitution63 
but is instead under the purview of the INA.64  Since it is based on statute, it 
is subject to “congressional design.”65 
INA section 301 governs the citizenship by descent of children born in 
wedlock,66 while INA section 309 governs the citizenship of children born 
out of wedlock.67  The distinction between “in” and “out” of wedlock is 
critical because it dramatically affects the ease with which the parent-child 
relationship is legally formed; the INA makes it easier for children born in 
wedlock to acquire citizenship compared to children born out of wedlock.68 
As a result of the different criteria mandated by sections 301 and 309, it is 
possible for a child to acquire jus sanguinis citizenship under one section 
while being denied it under the other.69  As such, determining whether a child 
is born in or out of wedlock is dispositive of whether or not a child can obtain 
birthright citizenship.70  This is particularly important to the ART children 
of same-sex spouses, like Aiden and Ethan, almost all of whom are 
considered born out of wedlock and therefore subject to INA section 309’s 
harsher requirements.71 
This Note focuses on jus sanguinis to isolate the role parents play in the 
acquisition of citizenship and, by extension, to analyze the differing 
 
 61. Id.; McFarland, supra note 58, at 471 (explaining that jus sanguinis “passes parental 
citizenship automatically to children”). 
 62. See McFarland, supra note 58, at 468. 
 63. Id. at 484–85. 
 64. See INA §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012). 
 65. McFarland, supra note 58, at 485; see Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998) 
(holding that “[p]ersons not born in the United States acquire citizenship by birth only as 
provided by Acts of Congress”); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898) 
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment “has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by 
being born abroad of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had 
always been, by Congress”). 
 66. 8 U.S.C. § 1401.  Initially, section 301 appears to generally govern “[n]ationals and 
citizens of the United States at birth.” Id.  Even though the statutory language does not 
explicitly say so, section 301 is interpreted to regulate only children born in wedlock. Scott 
Titshaw, Sorry Ma’am, Your Baby Is an Alien:  Outdated Immigration Rules and Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 47, 78 (2010).  If section 301’s scope 
were not limited in this way, it would also control birth out of wedlock and thereby render 
section 309 redundant. See id. 
 67. 8 U.S.C. § 1409. 
 68. See Craythorne, supra note 38, at 663.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1401, with 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1409. 
 69. See, for example, the case of the Dvash-Banks family where Ethan was denied 
citizenship when the DOS applied section 309 but was granted citizenship when the District 
Court for the Central District of California applied, upon review, section 301. Compare 
Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 3 (denying citizenship under section 309), with 
Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 2:18-cv-00523, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30525, at *18, *23 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 21, 2019) (granting citizenship under section 301), appeal docketed, No. 19-55517 
(9th Cir. May 6, 2019). 
 70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Titshaw, supra note 66, at 105; Craythorne, supra note 38, at 650. 
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treatment faced specifically by same-sex parents in attempting to transmit 
citizenship to their ART children. 
1.  Citizenship of Children Born in Wedlock Pursuant to INA Section 301 
INA section 301 provides varying sets of requirements for deriving 
citizenship from a parent based on three distinct groups of foreign-born 
children:  those born to (1) two U.S. citizens,72 (2) one U.S. citizen and one 
noncitizen U.S. national,73 and (3) one U.S. citizen and one alien.74  The third 
permutation is governed by INA section 301(g) and is the focus of this Note. 
The heaviest requirements fall on the third group of parents.  Under this 
category, to convey citizenship, the citizen-parent must have been 
“physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions” for at 
least five years, “at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen 
years.”75  In comparison, under the second group, it is sufficient for the 
citizen-parent to have resided in the United States for only one year prior to 
the child’s birth.76  Even further, the only requirement under the first group 
is for the citizen-parent to have “had a residence” in the United States or one 
of its outlying possessions prior to the birth of the child.77 
2.  Citizenship of Children Born out of Wedlock Pursuant to INA Section 
309 
Similar to section 301, section 309 sets out varying sets of requirements, 
but it does so based on the sex of the citizen-parent.78  If the child is born out 
of wedlock to a citizen-father, section 309(a) requires four criteria to be 
met.79  If these criteria are met, section 309(a) redirects to section 301, whose 
relevant provision (in this case section 301(g), which sets out the physical 
presence requirements) must also be satisfied.80  The four criteria are:  (1) a 
blood relationship between the child and the father must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence; (2) the father must be a national of the United 
 
 72. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c). 
 73. Id. § 1401(d).  A noncitizen national is “a person who, though not a citizen of the 
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” Id. § 1101(a)(22)(B). 
 74. Id. § 1401(g).  “[A]lien means any person not a citizen or national of the United 
States.” Id. § 1101(a)(3). 
 75. Id. § 1401(g). 
 76. Id. § 1401(d). 
 77. Id. § 1401(c). 
 78. See id. § 1409.  An analysis of this sex-based distinction is beyond the scope of this 
Note.  However, for a reckoning of “the gendered construction of the parent-child relationship 
in American nationality law,” see Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders:  Jus Sanguinis 
Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 
2233 (2014).  See also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, in which Justice Ginsburg comments that 
“[s]ections 1401 and 1409 . . . date from an era when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife 
with overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are” and accordingly rules that 
“[t]he gender-based distinction infecting [the relevant sections] . . . violates the equal 
protection principle.” 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689, 1700–01 (2017). 
 79. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a). 
 80. See id. 
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States at the time of the child’s birth; (3) the father (unless deceased) must 
agree, in writing, to provide financial support for the child until the age of 
eighteen; and (4) before the child turns eighteen, the child must be 
legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, the father must 
acknowledge paternity of the child in writing under oath, or the paternity of 
the child must be established by the adjudication of a competent court.81 
In contrast, if a child is born out of wedlock to a citizen-mother, section 
309 is silent regarding any additional requirements that need to be met.82  
Instead, under section 309(c), a child born out of wedlock outside the United 
States will acquire citizenship from the mother as long as the mother was a 
U.S. national at the time of birth and had previously resided in the United 
States for a certain amount of time.83  The physical presence requirement is 
specified as one year under section 309(c).84  However, pursuant to the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana,85 the provision, as 
written, applies only to children born before June 12, 2017 (the date of the 
decision).86  To transmit citizenship to children born abroad out of wedlock 
on or after that date, the citizen-mother must have resided in the United States 
for five years.87 
B.  The DOS’s Interpretation of the INA 
Despite painstakingly outlining the rules on how to transmit citizenship 
from parent to child, the INA is unclear on what actually constitutes a parent-
child relationship.88  As such, the question of who can transmit U.S. 
citizenship to a child remains open to the DOS’s interpretation.89  The DOS’s 
biology-based interpretation of parentage, however, disproportionally affects 
the recognition of parent-child relationships between same-sex couples and 
their ART children.90 
1.  The Ambiguity of the Parent-Child Relationship Under the INA 
Defining a parent-child relationship is crucial for two reasons.  First, 
whether, under jus sanguinis, a foreign-born child is eligible to acquire U.S. 
citizenship hinges on the existence of a parent-child relationship.91  Second, 
identifying who constitutes the parents of the child is necessary to determine 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. § 1409(c). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
 86. See id. at 1701. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c); see also Titshaw, supra note 14, at 418–19. 
 89. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 90. Titshaw, supra note 66, at 56. 
 91. See Titshaw, supra note 14, at 415. 
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whether these parents are married and, in turn, whether the child was born in 
or out of wedlock.92 
The INA does not define what constitutes a parent-child relationship for 
purposes of INA subchapter III, which governs citizenship and nationality.93  
The labyrinthine manner in which the Act defines and uses other relevant 
terms does not clarify the matter:  for instance, while the INA defines 
“parent” and “child,” erratic definitions of the terms apply to different 
sections of the Act.94  The definition of “child” as it applies to subchapter III 
is limited because it merely gives an example of who is “included” within 
the definition.95  The definition of “parent” as it applies to subchapter III is 
“even less helpful”96 since it only concerns the posthumous child of a 
deceased parent.97  Further, some provisions that depend most on 
establishing a parent-child relationship, including sections 301(g) and 309(a), 
do not refer to a “child” at all.98 
Lacking guidance from the INA on how to identify a parent-child 
relationship, courts are having difficulty determining who should be 
considered the parents of a child and whether the parents are married.99  This 
problem is becoming even more prominent in the age of ART, since ART 
has disproven the traditional assumption that children are born only when 
two opposite-sex parents unite “genetics, gestation, and intended 
parenthood.”100 
2.  The DOS’s Interpretation of the INA’s Ambiguity 
The ambiguity of the INA in defining “parent-child relationship” opens 
the door for statutory interpretation.  As the authority that enforces the INA’s 
provisions on citizenship transmission for foreign-born children, the DOS 
has the prerogative to interpret the Act.101  The DOS, in turn, interprets the 
INA’s citizenship transmission provisions in two important ways, both of 
which particularly affect same-sex couples. 
 
 92. See 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.1-2 (2019), https:// 
fam.state.gov/Fam/FAM.aspx?ID=08FAM [https://perma.cc/SA8D-XSJM] [hereinafter 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL].  Not to mention numerous other reasons the parent-child 
relationship is crucial for issues besides citizenship, including:  inheritance, social security 
benefits, health insurance, and custody. Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One 
Legal Stranger:  Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. 
REV. 341, 346 (2002). 
 93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c); Titshaw, supra note 14, at 418–19. 
 94. Section 101(b)(1)–(b)(2) defines “child” and “parent” for purposes of subchapters I 
and II, while section 101(c)(1)–(c)(2) provides more meager definitions of “child” and 
“parent” for purposes of subchapter III. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)–(2), (c)(1)–(2). 
 95. See id. § 1101(c); see also Titshaw, supra note 14, at 418. 
 96. Titshaw, supra note 14, at 418–19. 
 97. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(2). 
 98. See id. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a); see also Titshaw, supra note 66, at 76. 
 99. See Titshaw, supra note 66, at 69–70. 
 100. Id. at 63. 
 101. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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a.  DOS’s Understanding of Parentage 
The Foreign Affairs Manual (the “Manual”) codifies the DOS’s policies 
and elaborates on DOS’s position that the existence of a parent-child 
relationship is contingent upon the existence of a “blood” (i.e., biological) 
relationship.102  The Manual states that 
[t]he laws on acquisition of U.S. citizenship through a parent have always 
contemplated the existence of a blood relationship between the child and 
the parent(s) through whom citizenship is claimed.  It is not enough that the 
child is presumed to be the issue of the parents’ marriage by the laws of the 
jurisdiction where the child was born.  Absent a blood relationship between 
the child and the parent on whose citizenship the child’s own claim is based, 
U.S. citizenship is not acquired.103 
According to the DOS, this is true not only under section 309, which 
explicitly requires a blood relationship,104 but also under section 301, which 
is silent on the issue.105 
In other words, for a parent-child relationship to exist, which is the 
prerequisite for transmitting citizenship, the DOS requires “an actual 
biological relationship to a U.S. citizen parent.”106  So, an individual who 
intends to become the parent of a child but does not share a biological 
connection with the child does not qualify as a parent under the DOS’s 
interpretation of the INA and cannot transmit citizenship.107 
This biology-based interpretation particularly implicates same-sex 
couples.108  Same-sex couples who choose not to adopt rely on gamete 
donations and ART to have children.109  This means that, in same-sex 
relationships, at least one intended parent will always lack a biological 
connection with the child and, as a result, never be legally recognized as the 
parent of the child under the INA.110  If the unrecognized “parent” is the only 
one with U.S. citizenship (like Andrew is), the child will be denied U.S. 
citizenship for lack of an American parent (like Ethan was). 
There is only one narrow exception to this outcome.  In 2014, the DOS 
implemented a minor modification to its policy and now defines the 
biological mother as either the genetic mother or the gestational mother.111  
In other words, a child has a biological connection and therefore can establish 
 
 102. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 301.4-1(D). 
 103. Id. § 301.4-1(D)(1)(a). 
 104.  INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2012); FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, 
§ 301.4-1(D)(1)(b)(1). 
 105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401; FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 301.4-1(D)(1)(d). 
 106. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 301.4-1(D)(1)(d). 
 107. See id. 
 108. Higdon, supra note 42, at 168–69; Titshaw, supra note 66, at 56. 
 109. See Higdon, supra note 42, at 168.  See also supra note 42 for an exception to this 
statement regarding transgender parents. 
 110. Higdon, supra note 42, at 159. 
 111. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 301.4-1(D)(1)(c) (stating, “[a] woman 
may have a biological relationship with her child through either a genetic parental relationship 
or a gestational relationship”); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 50, at 1274. 
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a parent-child relationship with both the woman whose eggs were used in 
conception and the woman who carried and delivered the baby.112  As such, 
if a child is conceived using the eggs of one mother but is carried by the other 
mother, both intended parents will be recognized as parents under the INA.113  
However, even this exception provides limited solace to same-sex couples, 
as the discussion of the Blixt v. United States Department of State114 case in 
Part I.B.2.b suggests. 
b.  DOS’s Understanding of Wedlock 
The DOS also holds that for a child to be born in wedlock, and therefore 
be subject to INA section 301’s more lenient citizenship requirements, the 
child’s biological parents must be married.115  The Manual states, “[t]he term 
‘birth in wedlock’ has been consistently interpreted to mean birth during the 
marriage of the biological parents to each other.”116  Under this 
interpretation, a child conceived using donated sperm or eggs will always be 
born out of wedlock, even if the child’s intended parents are married.117 
This biology-based interpretation has, again, a disproportionate effect118 
on same-sex couples where at least one intended parent always lacks a 
biological relationship with the child.119  It follows that, although the 
intended parents of an ART child may be married, the biological parents will 
never be.  As a result, the true consequence of the DOS’s interpretation is 
that all ART children of same-sex couples are categorically born out of 
wedlock and subject to the stricter citizenship requirements under section 
309.120 
The narrow 2014 DOS modification that allows both intended lesbian 
parents to be considered biological parents is the only exception to this 
rule.121  Under the exception, the child of a married lesbian couple is 
considered born in wedlock as long as the baby is conceived from the egg of 
one mother and carried by the second mother since, in that case, both mothers 
are considered the biological parents of the child.122 
 
 112. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92 § 301.4-1(D)(1)(c). 
 113. See id. § 304.3-1(b); see also Sarah Mervosh, Gay U.S. Couple Sues State Dept. for 
Denying Their Baby Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
07/23/us/state-department-assisted-reproductive-citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/SMJ5-
DC9X] (providing a summary of the DOS’s policy, including the 2014 exception). 
 114. No. 1:18-cv-00124 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22, 2018). 
 115. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92 § 304.1-2(c). 
 116. Id. § 304.1-2(a). 
 117. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Baby Without a Country:  Determining Citizenship for 
Assisted Reproduction Children Born Overseas, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 337 (2014). 
 118. Higdon, supra note 42, at 168–69; Titshaw, supra note 66, at 56. 
 119. Higdon, supra note 42, at 159. 
 120. See Titshaw, supra note 66, at 105; Craythorne, supra note 38, at 650. 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13. 
 122. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 304.3-1(b) (stating that “[a] child born 
abroad to a U.S. citizen gestational mother who is the legal parent of the child at the time of 
birth in the location of birth, whose genetic parents are an anonymous sperm donor and the 
U.S. citizen wife of the gestational legal mother, is considered for citizenship purposes to be 
a person born in wedlock of two U.S. citizens”). 
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However, as mentioned previously, this exception protects only a very 
small margin of same-sex couples, and not even all lesbian couples as 
evidenced by a case that is currently pending before the District Court for the 
District of Columbia.123  Allison Blixt, a U.S. citizen, filed the case.124  
Allison’s wife, Stefania Zaccari, is an Italian citizen.125  The couple has two 
sons, Lucas and Massimiliano (“Massi”), both of whom were born during 
Allison’s marriage to Stefania.126  Allison and Stefania each carried a child 
who was conceived using their own eggs and sperm from an unknown 
donor.127  Allison conceived and carried Massi while Stefania conceived and 
carried Lucas.128  Both gave birth in England.129 
Through the U.S. embassy in London, the DOS found that both children 
were born out of wedlock and applied the stricter provisions of INA section 
309.130  The DOS found that, even under its modified interpretation, the 
biological parents of the children were not married since, in both pregnancies, 
each woman used her own eggs to conceive the child and carried the child.131  
This means that each child has only one biological mother.132  The children 
could have been born in wedlock only if, for example, Allison carried a child 
that was conceived using Stefania’s eggs instead of her own.133 
The situation of the Zaccari-Blixt family demonstrates that, while the 
modified the DOS interpretation may be a step in the right direction, it is 
markedly far from eliminating the prejudicial treatment same-sex ART 
families are subjected to under the DOS’s interpretation of the INA. 
II.  CITIZEN UNLESS BORN TO SAME-SEX PARENTS:  PROBLEMS WITH THE 
DOS’S INTERPRETATION OF THE INA 
Because it disproportionately affects same-sex couples’ right to transmit 
citizenship to their ART children, the DOS’s biology-based interpretation of 
parentage raises serious concerns about the constitutionally protected rights 
of same-sex couples, as recognized in recent Supreme Court decisions.  It 
also prompts questions about the soundness of relying strictly on biology 
instead of intent in determining parentage, which appears to contradict the 
purpose of the INA itself. 
 
 123. See generally Complaint, Blixt v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1:18-cv-00124 (D.D.C. Jan. 
22, 2018) [hereinafter Zaccari-Blixt Complaint]. 
 124. Id. at 4. 
 125. Id. at 11. 
 126. Id. at 12–13. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 14–15. 
 131. See id. at 15. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
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A.  The DOS’s Interpretation and the Constitutional Rights of Same-Sex 
Couples 
Although it may appear that the DOS’s interpretation of the INA 
jeopardizes only the right of ART children to citizenship, this is incorrect.134  
The DOS’s interpretation also calls into question the right to transmit 
citizenship, which belongs to the parents of ART children.135  Accordingly, 
same-sex parents’ constitutional rights are implicated. 
In a series of cases that culminated in the legalization of same-sex 
marriage, the Supreme Court expanded LGBTQ rights over the span of two 
decades.136  In United States v. Windsor,137 the Court struck down section 3 
of the Defense of Marriage Act138 (DOMA), which, for federal purposes, 
restricted marriage to “a legal union between one man and one woman.”139  
The petitioners, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, were a same-sex couple 
whose marriage was recognized in New York, where they resided.140  When 
Spyer died, she left her entire estate to Windsor, who then attempted to claim 
the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses.141  Section 3 of 
DOMA barred Windsor from benefitting from this exemption and she was 
instead subjected to $363,053 in estate taxes.142  The Court struck down 
section 3 as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.143 
Two years later, in Obergefell v. Hodges,144 the Court expanded Windsor 
by striking down state bans on same-sex marriage.145  In Obergefell, the 
petitioners consisted of fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-
sex partners were deceased.146  Together, they claimed that the laws of 
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment by restricting marriage to a union between one man and one 
woman.147  They argued that these laws denied them the right to marry or 
 
 134. See Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 52, at 706. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Prior to these cases, the Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), which held that laws criminalizing sodomy were constitutional, in Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003), which recognized that it is not the job of the state to “define the 
meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries.”  In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), 
the Court held that an amendment to the Colorado state constitution preventing protected 
status based on homosexuality or bisexuality violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 137. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 138. See id. at 2695. 
 139. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 
(1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 140. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 2695. 
 144. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 145. Id. at 2607 (concluding that “[t]he Constitution . . . does not permit the State to bar 
same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite 
sex”). 
 146. Id. at 2593. 
 147. Id. 
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have their marriages, which were lawfully performed in another state, be 
fully recognized in their respective states.148  Ultimately, the Court found 
that, under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples cannot be denied their 
fundamental right to marry.149 
In 2017, Pavan v. Smith150 became the first Supreme Court case to address 
issues that arose regarding the application and scope of Obergefell.  The 
petitioners were two married same-sex couples who conceived children 
through anonymous sperm donation.151  They sued when the Arkansas 
Department of Health refused to include the name of each birth mother’s wife 
on the child’s birth certificate.152  The petitioners challenged the 
constitutionality of an Arkansas statute that required the name of the mother’s 
husband to appear on the birth certificate regardless of his biological 
relationship to the child but permitted the omission of the mother’s wife’s 
name.153  The Arkansas Supreme Court found that the statute “does not run 
afoul of Obergefell ” since it “centers on the relationship of the biological 
mother and the biological father to the child, not on the marital relationship 
of husband and wife.”154  In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court 
reversed, finding that the differential treatment violates Obergefell’s goal of 
providing same-sex couples “the constellation of benefits that the States have 
linked to marriage.”155 
Pavan is important for clarifying that the right of same-sex couples to 
marry includes protection from differential treatment in terms of the benefits 
associated with marriage.  At the same time, Pavan also demonstrates that 
the seemingly straightforward application of the universal right to marry is 
nevertheless open to a certain degree of interpretation.156  This adds a dose 
of unpredictability to the manner in which Windsor and Obergefell apply to 
the treatment of same-sex ART parents in the context of citizenship law.  
Ultimately, however, there is little doubt that the DOS’s interpretation raises 
serious constitutional questions since, by virtue of categorically considering 
ART children of married same-sex couples as born out of wedlock, it fails to 
give full recognition to same-sex marriages.157 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 2604–05. 
 150. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 151. Id. at 2077. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015)). 
 156. See G. M. Filisko, After Obergefell:  The Supreme Court Ruling Settled the Issue of 
Marriage Equality—While Unsettling Other Legal Matters, A.B.A. J., June 2016, at 56, 58 
(sharing a discussion with Douglas NeJaime where NeJaime points out “a lot of states were 
going to, of course, allow same-sex couples to get married, but that there would be issues that 
would follow from that about what their marriage would mean for other laws”). 
 157. Importantly, opposite-sex couples may also use ART to conceive children and 
confront similar problems.  However, that does not change the constitutionally suspect effect 
that the DOS’s interpretation has on essentially all same-sex couples, which is the focus of 
this Note. 
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Pavan supports the constitutionally suspect nature of the DOS’s 
interpretation.  In Pavan, the Court found that birth certificates “give married 
parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to unmarried parents” 
and that, accordingly, Arkansas may not “deny married same-sex couples 
that recognition.”158  Ability to transmit citizenship under section 301 is a 
similar “form of legal recognition that is not available to unmarried parents” 
and the DOS may similarly not “deny married same-sex couples that 
recognition.”159 
Further, the DOS’s interpretation also disregards the reasoning of the 
Court in both Windsor and Obergefell.  In both cases, the Court gave great 
weight to the harm that children would suffer if the marriage of their same-
sex parents was either not allowed or not recognized.  In Windsor, the Court 
found that when same-sex marriage is recognized at the state level but denied 
at the federal level, it becomes a “second-tier” marriage that “humiliates tens 
of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.”160  
Similarly, in Obergefell, the Court partly justified its decision by 
emphasizing how, “[w]ithout the recognition, stability, and predictability 
marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are 
somehow lesser.”161  Notably, two petitioners in Obergefell, April DeBoer 
and Jayne Rowse, brought their initial suit because, under Michigan adoption 
laws, only one could be recognized as the legal parent of their children.162  
The Court acknowledged that not recognizing DeBoer’s and Rowse’s equal 
claim to parenthood denied “them the certainty and stability all mothers 
desire to protect their children.”163 
The Court’s reasoning in both cases is applicable to the predicament of 
same-sex parents of ART children.  The similarity of DeBoer and Rowse’s 
complaint to that of the Dvash-Bankses or Zaccari-Blixts is especially 
relevant.  By considering the ART children of essentially all same-sex 
parents as born out of wedlock and thereby denying them a more lenient path 
to citizenship,164 the DOS’s interpretation undermines the importance the 
Court places on protecting children. 
 
 158. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078–79. 
 159. Id.; see also Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 9 (similarly arguing that the 
“constellation of benefits . . . linked to marriage” includes “legal recognition that same-sex 
spouses may both be the parents of a child born during their marriage, even if only one spouse 
is the child’s biological parent” (emphasis added)).  The DOS is likely to hold that, since it 
modified its policy in 2014 to include gestational mothers in its definition of biological 
parents, same-sex parents can benefit from section 301.  However, as Part I.B.2.b discussed, 
this is a very narrow exception that only benefits a small fraction of lesbian parents—making 
the modification superficial.  In effect, the DOS’s interpretation still causes categorically 
differential treatment of same-sex parents. 
 160. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (finding that not giving full 
recognition to same-sex marriages makes it “more difficult for the children to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their 
community and in their daily lives”). 
 161. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015). 
 162. Id. at 2595. 
 163. Id. at 2606. 
 164. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
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“The government should be concerned not only about making sure that its 
citizens are allowed to live full family lives, but that its citizens are not 
deprived of lawful status and that they can exercise that citizenship 
effectively.”165  By denying married same-sex parents of ART children the 
right to transmit citizenship, the DOS deprives them of both a full family life 
and the ability to exercise their citizenship effectively.166  It also violates their 
constitutional rights recognized in the holdings and reasoning of both 
Windsor and Obergefell. 
B.  The DOS’s Interpretation and Intent-Based Parentage 
The underlying problem of the DOS’s interpretation is that it is based 
purely on biology and places no weight on intention.167  While the DOS may 
have narrowly expanded its definition of “biological” to include gestational 
mothers, the Zaccari-Blixt case illustrates that this expansion is a feeble 
attempt to cover a deeper problem.168  That the DOS now considers both 
gestation and “the nationality of the sperm and egg” in determining parentage 
does not change the reality that it still does not consider the intention of a 
person to become a parent.169 
1.  Incompatibility of Biology-Based Parentage with the INA’s Purpose 
“Family reunification has been the centerpiece of our legal immigration 
system for decades, and it should remain so.”170  Doris Meissner, former 
commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),171 made 
this statement before Congress in 1995.172  Family unity has rightfully been 
recognized as a staple of the U.S. immigration system because “[f]amilies are 
the backbone of our country and their unity promotes the stability, health, 
and productivity of family members contributing to the economic and social 
welfare of the United States.”173  Without this emphasis on unity, families 
would be “fractured along citizenship lines,” thereby dismantling the very 
 
 165. Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 52, at 707. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 122–32. 
 169. Titshaw, supra note 14, at 422. 
 170. Reform of Legal Immigration:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 13 (1995) [hereinafter Reform Hearings] (statement of 
Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (testifying that “the 
reunification of U.S. citizens with their spouses and minor children [should remain] as the 
Nation’s top priority for legal immigration”). 
 171. In 2003, “[t]he INS was abolished and its functions placed under three agencies—U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)—within the newly created Department of 
Homeland Security.” Organizational Timeline, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/organizational-timeline 
[https://perma.cc/53JL-Q682] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 172. See Reform Hearings, supra note 170, at 13. 
 173. Immigration Policy:  An Overview:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 55 (2001) (statement of Karen K. Narasaki, President 
and Executive Director, National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium). 
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core of American society.174  Family unification has been the focus of not 
only congressional testimony but also of U.S. attorneys general,175 federal 
courts,176 and the Board of Immigration Appeals.177 
In enacting the INA, Congress prioritized family unity.  Congress designed 
the INA to make it easier, not harder, for families to stay together.178  This is 
evidenced in a House report commenting on the bill that later became the 
original INA.179  In the report, the House Judiciary Committee found that the 
proposed legislation “implements the underlying intention of our 
immigration laws regarding the preservation of the family unit.”180 
When Congress amended the INA for the first time in 1957, the House 
Judiciary Committee produced a new report, reaffirming that the INA’s 
language makes Congress’s intention to “preserve the family unit upon 
immigration to the United States” clear.181  The 1957 House report also 
echoed the language of a Senate Judiciary Committee report from 1952 in 
finding that Congress “intended to provide for a liberal treatment of 
children.”182 
The 1957 House report further emphasized that, given “the clearly 
expressed legislative intention to keep together the family unit wherever 
possible,” it is “a desirable result . . . to adopt a liberal construction.  No harm 
could possibly result from such a construction, and the consequences would 
fulfill the humane considerations involved in keeping intact the family 
unit.”183  The current DOS interpretation is incompatible with Congress’s 
clear legislative intent in enacting the INA. 
2.  Arbitrariness of Biology-Based Parentage in Citizenship Transmission 
Massi Zaccari-Blixt was ultimately granted citizenship following an 
arduous process.184  To transmit citizenship to her son, Allison had to first 
 
 174. See Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 8. 
 175. See, e.g., In re K-W-S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 396, 407 (Att’y Gen. 1961) (Robert F. Kennedy 
stated, “our only concern is that a bona fide family unit, recognized as such under the 
immigration laws, shall not be separated by strained and artificial reasoning.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding “the separation 
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scrutiny”); Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (defining “stepchild” 
liberally based, in part, on the “expressed congressional policy of keeping family units 
together”). 
 177. The Board of Immigration Appeals “is the highest administrative body for interpreting 
and applying immigration laws.” Board of Immigration Appeals, DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/Z7DZ-LW3V] 
(last updated Oct. 15, 2018); see, e.g., In re G-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 355, 359 (B.I.A. 1959) (finding 
that it is “apparent from the legislative history that Congress had in mind the family unit”). 
 178. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1199, at 2026 (1957) (stating that “it has been the policy of the 
Congress to approve legislation designed to facilitate the reunification of families”). 
 179. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365 (1952). 
 180. Id. at 1680. 
 181. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1199, at 2021. 
 182. Id. at 2020. 
 183. Id. at 2021. 
 184. See Zaccari-Blixt Complaint, supra note 123, at 2. 
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establish herself as Massi’s parent by satisfying the DOS’s requirement for a 
biological relationship between parent and child.185  She then had to meet the 
requisite criteria to transmit citizenship to children born out of wedlock under 
section 309, which the DOS chose to apply because, even though Allison was 
married to Stefania at the time of Massi’s birth, Stefania was not Massi’s 
biological parent.186  Lucas Zaccari-Blixt, however, was immediately denied 
birthright citizenship because Allison did not have a biological relationship 
with her firstborn son.187 
These nonsensical effects of the DOS’s policy are perhaps even more 
evident in the two newest lawsuits to join those of the Dvash-Banks and 
Zaccari-Blixt families.  First is the case of the Mize-Gregg family, where the 
daughter of James Derek Mize and Jonathan Gregg, Simone, was denied 
citizenship even though both parents are American citizens.188  Second is the 
case of the Kiviti family, where the daughter of Roee and Adiel Kiviti, 
Kessem, was also denied citizenship even though, again, both parents are 
American citizens.189 
Both Simone and Kessem were conceived using an anonymous donor egg 
and one father’s sperm, and both were born via a gestational surrogate 
abroad.190  Both sets of parents were married at the time of birth.191  Yet, in 
determining their citizenship status, DOS officials held that both Simone and 
Kessem were born out of wedlock and accordingly applied the harsher 
requirements of section 309.192  In both cases, the intended father who does 
not share a biological relationship with his respective child was deemed 
unable to transmit citizenship under section 309.193  So, the focus was shifted 
to the fathers who could prove a biological connection—Simone’s dad, 
Jonathan, and Kessem’s dad, Adiel.194 
Jonathan and Adiel satisfied the criteria under section 309.195  However, 
this only redirected the officials to section 301 to confirm that they also met 
the physical presence requirements.196  For unclear reasons, however, the 
officials applied section 301(g) in both cases, which controls when one parent 
 
 185. Id. at 13–14. 
 186. See id. at 14–15. 
 187. Id. at 3. 
 188. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 5, 20, Mize v. Pompeo, No. 1:19-
cv-3331-MLB (N.D. Ga. July 29, 2019) [hereinafter Mize-Gregg Complaint]. 
 189. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, 13, Kiviti v. Pompeo, Civil Action 
No. 19-2665 (D. Md. Sept. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Kiviti Complaint]. 
 190. Id. at 11–12; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at 16. 
 191. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 11; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at 
15. 
 192. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at 
20. 
 193. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at 
20. 
 194. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at 
20. 
 195. See Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, 
at 20. 
 196. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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is an alien, instead of 301(c), which applies when both parents are citizens.197  
Pursuant to section 301(g), they found that neither Jonathan nor Adiel had 
satisfied the minimum five-year presence requirement that would allow them 
to transmit citizenship to their daughters.198  Simone and Kessem were, 
therefore, denied citizenship.199 
Interestingly, Kessem was Adiel and his husband Roee’s only child to face 
these hurdles.200  The couple had previously relied on a donor egg, one 
father’s sperm, and a gestational surrogate to conceive their first child, 
Lev.201  When they applied for Lev’s citizenship, however, the DOS official 
at the time chose not to ask for biological proof between Lev and either of 
his fathers and simply issued the American passport.202  Since neither the law 
nor the conception method changed since Lev’s birth, it can be assumed that 
the difference in treatment stems from the DOS’s unfortunate prerogative to 
arbitrarily and selectively apply its policy. 
The stories of the four families exemplify how, in the age of ART, a 
biology-based definition of parentage leads to senseless citizenship results.  
Blind reliance on biology in determining parentage leads to situations where 
the person who has been raising a child with her wife for four years is not 
recognized as the child’s parent;203 where one twin is granted citizenship 
while the other is denied it;204 and where children are considered born out of 
wedlock even though their parents are married.205 
In other words, biology-based parentage prompts recognition or denial of 
citizenship under the INA based on arbitrary technicalities.206  Yet, “ART is 
not used accidentally.”207  These technicalities do not reflect the deliberate 
efforts of intended parents who invest time, money, and emotions into ART 
to have a child.208  Biology-based parentage unjustifiably ignores the fact 
that “[p]arents who utilize ART do so for the singular purpose of producing 
a child.”209 
 
 197. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at 
25. 
 198. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at 
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 203. See Zaccari-Blixt Complaint, supra note 123, at 12, 15–16. 
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note 1, at 3; Zaccari-Blixt Complaint, supra note 123, at 16–17. 
 206. See Craythorne, supra note 38, at 653. 
 207. ABA RESOLUTION 113, supra note 29, at 8. 
 208. See Hill, supra note 10, at 414–15 (making a “but for” causation argument by stating 
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 209. ABA RESOLUTION 113, supra note 29, at 8. 
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3.  Movement Toward Intent-Based Parentage 
Acknowledging the arbitrary and discriminatory effects of the DOS’s 
biology-based policy, many authorities are driving a movement toward the 
acceptance of intent-based parentage in interpreting the INA’s citizenship 
transmission provisions. 
a.  Judicial Rejection of the DOS’s Interpretation 
In February 2019, the District Court for the Central District of California 
found that Ethan had derived American citizenship from Andrew at birth, 
even though the two do not share a biological connection.210  The court held 
that Andrew and Elad are indisputably Ethan’s parents and, as such, “the only 
issue is whether section 301 requires [Ethan] . . . to demonstrate a biological 
relationship with both of his married parents.”211  The court proceeded to 
find that section 301 does not impose such a requirement and that the DOS’s 
reading to the contrary is a “strained” interpretation of the INA.212  The DOS 
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.213  However, the ruling will 
almost certainly be affirmed, given that the Ninth Circuit has, in the past, 
explicitly rejected the DOS’s interpretation of the INA and is spearheading 
the movement for recognizing intent-based parentage.214 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the INA’s citizenship 
transmission provisions is based on the assumption that biology is not 
necessary to establish a parent-child relationship.  This is evidenced in its 
two leading cases, Scales v. INS 215 and Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales,216 where 
the Ninth Circuit found that the nonbiological parents transmitted citizenship 
to their respective children.217  In August 2018, the Second Circuit, in Jaen 
v. Sessions,218 also adopted the Ninth Circuit’s approach.219  Together, the 
three cases present alternative methods to reach the same conclusion that 
intent is key in determining parentage.220 
Stanley Russell Scales, Jr. was born in the Philippines to his biological 
Filipino mother.221  At the time of birth, his mother was married to an 
 
 210. Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 2:18-cv-00523, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30525, at *17, 
*23 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-55517 (9th Cir. May 6, 2019). 
 211. Id. at *18. 
 212. Id. at *11, *18. 
 213. See generally Notice of Appeal, Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 2:18-cv-00523, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30525 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019). 
 214. See infra text accompanying notes 221–32. 
 215. 232 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 216. 401 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 217. See id. at 1094; Scales, 232 F.3d at 1164. 
 218. 899 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 219. Id. at 190. 
 220. While all three cases deal with opposite-sex marriages, they stand more broadly for 
the Ninth and Second Circuits’ rejection of the DOS’s interpretation requiring a blood 
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involving same-sex marriages and ART. Titshaw, supra note 66, at 107. 
 221. Scales, 232 F.3d at 1161–62. 
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American man who raised Scales as his own son.222  The court held that 
Scales’s nonbiological American father should be considered a “parent” 
under section 301 and be able to transmit citizenship to Scales.223  In reaching 
its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit conducted a “straightforward reading” of 
section 301 and found that “there is no requirement of a blood relationship” 
to establish parentage.224  It then emphasized the difference between sections 
301 and 309 by stating that section 309 “clearly was enacted, ‘at least in part, 
to ensure that a person born out of wedlock who claims citizenship by birth 
actually shares a blood relationship with an American citizen’”225 and that 
“[i]f Congress had wanted to ensure the same about a person born in wedlock, 
‘it knew how to do so.’”226 
Eduardo Solis-Espinoza was born in Mexico to his biological Mexican 
mother.227  However, at the time of his birth, Solis-Espinoza’s biological 
Mexican father was married to Stella Cruz-Dominguez, a U.S. citizen who 
raised Solis-Espinoza as her own son.228  The Ninth Circuit held that, even 
though she is not biologically related to Solis-Espinoza, Cruz-Dominguez 
should be considered his parent under section 301 and accordingly transmit 
citizenship to Solis-Espinoza.229  The court found the result “logical” since 
Cruz-Dominguez was Solis-Espinoza’s parent “[i]n every practical 
sense.”230  Unlike in Scales, however, the court based its decision on 
California law, the state where the family was domiciled.231  The court found 
that the requirements of California law were satisfied and established Cruz-
Dominguez as Solis-Espinoza’s parent since birth under section 301.232 
Finally, Levy Alberto Jaen was born in Panama to a foreign mother who 
was married to Jorge Boreland, a U.S. citizen, at the time of birth.233  
Although Boreland is not Jaen’s biological father, he raised Jaen as his own 
son.234  The court found that Boreland was a parent under section 301 and 
accordingly transmitted citizenship to Jaen.235  The court provided three 
alternative ways to reach the same conclusion.  First, given the INA’s silence 
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 223. Id. at 1166. 
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 225. Id. (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 435 (1998)). 
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as to the definition of “parent,” the court turned to the common law’s 
“presumption of parentage based on marriage.”236  Consequently, it 
concluded that, since Jaen was born during Boreland’s marriage to Jaen’s 
mother, Boreland was presumed to be Jaen’s parent.237  Second, the Second 
Circuit echoed the Ninth Circuit’s statutory analysis in Scales by reiterating 
that “Congress clearly specified enhanced requirements [in the form of a 
biological relationship] for proof of parentage in the case of children born 
out of wedlock,” not for children born in wedlock.238  Finally, the court held 
that Boreland would be Jaen’s parent even under relevant New York law.239 
b.  Rejection of the DOS’s Interpretation by Supporting Authorities 
State courts and legislatures, members of Congress and the Senate, the 
American Bar Association (ABA), and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) 
have also endorsed the Ninth and Second Circuits’ interpretations of 
parentage. 
Surrogacy laws of Connecticut,240 Maine,241 Nevada,242 and New 
Hampshire243 for example, recognize the legal parentage of intended parents 
even when the parents do not have a genetic connection to the child.  
California,244 Connecticut,245 and Vermont246 state courts, among others, 
have also recognized intention as a determinative factor in parentage. 
In a similar vein, nineteen Democratic senators and eighty members of the 
House of Representatives have signed sharply worded letters to Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo, demanding changes to the DOS’s “discriminatory”247 
and “cruel”248 interpretation of the INA.  Although the letters refrain from 
explicitly calling for intent-based parentage, they clearly reject the DOS’s 
biology-focused approach by pointing out that “every federal court that has 
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addressed this issue has found that no biological requirement exists”249 and 
that “Section 301 of the INA makes no requirement that either parent of a 
U.S. married couple . . . must prove biological relation to their child.”250 
Similarly, the ABA has issued both a resolution and position paper to 
elucidate its support of intent-based parentage.251  The position paper 
concludes that requiring a biological link between parent and child “is 
inappropriate and violative of the privacy of intended parents.”252  The ABA 
urges the DOS to interpret section 301 to recognize children born to intended 
parents even in the absence of a biological relationship, as long as the parent-
child relationship is recognized by the child’s country of birth.253  It further 
counsels that this expanded interpretation apply retroactively.254  In the 
position paper, the ABA also conducts an analysis similar to the Scales and 
Jaen courts by emphasizing the silence of section 301 as to the requirement 
of a biological connection.255 
The ABA has codified its suggestions in two model acts—the Model Act 
Governing Assisted Reproduction256 (adopted January 2019) and the 
supplemental Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Agencies257 (adopted February 2016).  Both acts rely on “intended 
parentage” as a basis for establishing the parent-child relationship.258 
Finally, through its newest version of the Uniform Parentage Act259 
(UPA), the ULC has also rejected the DOS’s policy.260  The ULC aims to 
provide “states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted 
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legislation.”261  It first presented the UPA, a uniform statutory scheme, in 
1973 to offer comprehensive guidance in determining a child’s legal 
parentage.262  A central reason behind the UPA’s 2017 revision was “to 
update the Act to ensure that it applies equally to children born to same-sex 
couples”263 in a way that is reflective of recently recognized constitutional 
rights.264  Unlike the DOS’s policy, the UPA “has and continues to take the 
position that actual parent-child bonds are important to children and that 
these relationships are worthy of protection, even if the parent and the child 
are not also connected by biology.”265 
The 2017 UPA expands recognition of nonbiological parentage in two 
ways that are particularly relevant to this Note.  First, in articles 7 and 8, it 
recognizes that same-sex couples, not just opposite-sex couples, can become 
parents through ART.266  In fact, the 2017 UPA makes clear that its ART 
provisions apply to everyone, regardless of sex, sexual orientation, or marital 
status.267  It then confirms that children born through ART do not need to 
have a genetic or gestational connection with their parents.268  Indeed, 
articles 7 and 8 focus entirely on the parent’s conduct in establishing 
parentage.269  Second, the 2017 UPA requires courts to consider a range of 
factors in deciding who, of multiple claimants, should be considered a child’s 
parent when genetics and conduct lead to differing results.270  In doing so, 
the revised act reinforces the notion that biology does not automatically 
trump intent.271 
III.  A DUAL APPROACH:  COUNTERACTING THE EFFECTS OF THE DOS’S 
POLICY ON SAME-SEX PARENTS 
The current DOS practice of arbitrarily denying citizenship to the ART 
children of same-sex parents is almost certainly unconstitutional under 
Windsor and Obergefell.272  The policy’s fixation on biology in determining 
parentage undermines the congressionally established, legitimate, and 
 
 261. Overview, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/ 
overview [https://perma.cc/X6Y7-VV4J] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 262. Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), YALE L.J. 
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important purpose that underlies the INA.273  The DOS harms family unity 
by making it harder, not easier, for families like the Dvash-Bankses, Zaccari-
Blixts, Mize-Greggs, and Kivitis to stay together.274  In fact, the DOS “fails 
spectacularly” at achieving even the government’s own goals in regulating 
immigration.275 
The most straightforward way of initiating change and protecting families 
like the Dvash-Bankses and the Zaccari-Blixts would be for the DOS to 
change its own policy.  However, this seems unlikely given that the only 
noteworthy change the DOS has granted was the minimal “gestation 
modification” in 2014.276  The DOS is seemingly impervious to the 
resistance that is building against its policy, including consequential court 
decisions. 
Part III accordingly presents a dual approach to counteract the effects of 
the DOS’s interpretation.  First, Part III.A proposes congressional 
amendment to the INA as the most efficient resolution.  Second, Part III.B 
suggests a collaborative approach whereby parents utilize federal courts to 
assert their claims and state legislators proactively reform their parentage 
laws to strengthen those claims. 
A.  Congressional Amendment of the INA 
The DOS’s policy was born out of the lack of clarity in the INA as to what 
constitutes a parent-child relationship.277  The ambiguity allowed the DOS 
to intervene and interpret parent-child relationships in a “genetic-
essentialist”278 manner.279  The most efficient solution to the problems 
caused by the DOS’s interpretation is simple:  Congress must amend the INA 
to provide a clear definition of “parent.”  In doing so, Congress would clarify 
who constitutes the parent in the parent-child relationship and, consequently, 
render the DOS’s interpretation irrelevant.  Simultaneously, Congress should 
also consider replacing the term “blood relationship” in INA section 309 with 
“parent-child relationship” to reiterate its support of intent-based parentage. 
Given the increasing reliance on ART to have children,280 Congress must 
make these amendments rapidly.  Failure to do so will inevitably lead to an 
exponential increase in same-sex couples who suffer from the effects of the 
DOS’s policy.281  Congress should turn to its own history for guidance in 
enacting the amendment swiftly.  As originally enacted, section 1993 of the 
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Revised Statutes of 1878282 only allowed fathers to transmit citizenship.283  
Recognizing the unequal treatment faced by women, Congress amended 
section 1993 to also allow mothers to transmit citizenship.284  In making the 
amendment, Congress aimed to reflect the changing standards of the time. 
The same reasoning applies for amending the INA to reflect the previously 
unanticipated right of ART parents to transmit citizenship.  Just as today it 
would be unacceptable to deny women the right to transmit citizenship based 
on sex, it is also unacceptable that ART parents are denied the same right due 
to sexual orientation. 
This impetus of Congress should be further strengthened by the fact that 
Congress itself enacted the INA in a manner specifically cognizant and 
protective of family unity.285  Recognizing intent-based parentage is a 
straightforward solution to protecting the rights of ART families.286  It is 
therefore not only in harmony with but also in furtherance of congressional 
intent. 
1.  Requisite Amendment:  Defining “Parent” 
To address the underlying problem with the DOS’s interpretation, 
Congress must provide a clear definition of “parent” that reflects the 
nonbiological ways in which an individual can become a parent in the age of 
ART.  In other words, Congress must explicitly recognize intent-based 
parentage.  Recognition of intent-based parentage would first require the 
DOS to accept the existence of a parent-child relationship between an 
intended parent and their child, such as between Andrew and Ethan.  Second, 
it would allow a child to be considered born in wedlock as long as the child’s 
intended parents were married at the time of birth, like Andrew and Elad 
were.  This, in turn, would require the DOS to subject same-sex parents and 
their ART children to the rightful and more lenient citizenship requirements 
of INA section 301, like the Dvash-Banks family should have been. 
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the U.S. Code, LIBR. CONGRESS BLOGS (July 2, 2015), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/07/the-
revised-statutes-of-the-united-states-predecessor-to-the-u-s-code/ [https://perma.cc/MT4B-
E3HE]. 
 283. It stated: 
All children heretofore or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the 
United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens 
thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship 
shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States. 
Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 310 (1961) (applying section 1993 to find the citizen-
mother married to the noncitizen could not transmit citizenship to their foreign-born child). 
 284. H.R. REP. NO. 3673, at 797 (1934).  Today, this amendment is reflected in INA section 
301(h), which recognizes that mothers, not just fathers, can transmit citizenship to children 
who were born abroad prior to the congressional amendment in 1934. INA § 301(h), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(h) (2012). 
 285. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 286. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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To codify these changes, it is sufficient for Congress to make a minor 
addition to INA section 101(c), which provides definitions for the relevant 
subchapter III of the statute.287  Currently, the only definition of “parent” 
under section 101(c) is:  “[t]he terms ‘parent’, ‘father’, and ‘mother’ include 
in the case of a posthumous child a deceased parent, father, and mother.”288  
This definition does not answer the question of how a parent is identified.  
Using the 2017 UPA definition of “intended parent”289 as guidance, 
Congress must add to this subsection by defining “parent” in a manner 
similar to the following:  “the terms ‘parent’, ‘mother’, and ‘father’ refer to 
individuals who, at the time of birth, demonstrate an intent to be legally 
bound as a parent of the child born naturally or through assisted reproductive 
technology.” 
By clarifying that the determinative factor to become a legal parent is 
intent, this expanded definition of “parent” ensures that the lack of biological 
connection does not destroy a parent-child relationship.  Since section 301 
falls under subchapter III of the INA, the DOS will be bound by this amended 
definition.  The new definition will have an immediate impact on section 301 
since, of the section’s eight subsections, four include the term “parents”290 
and one refers to both “mother” and “father.”291 
2.  Discretionary Amendment:  Replacing the Term “Blood Relationship” 
Currently, INA section 309(a)(1) requires that “a blood relationship 
between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing 
evidence” as the first step for fathers to transmit citizenship to their children 
born out of wedlock.292  The requirement of a “blood relationship” supports 
the DOS’s biology-based interpretation, although only within the context of 
section 309. 
To ensure sweeping application of intent-based parentage, Congress must 
consider a second amendment in the form of replacing the term “blood 
relationship” with “parent-child relationship.”  Expanding the definition of 
“parent” under section 101(c) is mandatory to eliminate ambiguity as to how 
jus sanguinis citizenship is transmitted to ART children born in wedlock.293  
Further amendment is not strictly necessary to protect the rights of married 
same-sex parents to transmit citizenship to their children, which is the 
primary focus of this Note.  Nevertheless, the second discretionary 
amendment is strongly encouraged for two reasons.  First, it protects the 
rights of same-sex parents who have chosen to have children through ART 
without getting married.  Second, it confirms and universalizes Congress’s 
 
 287. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c). 
 288. Id. § 1101(c)(2). 
 289. The 2017 UPA defines “intended parent” as “an individual, married or unmarried, 
who manifests an intent to be legally bound as a parent of a child conceived by assisted 
reproduction.” UPA 2017 § 102(13) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 290. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(e), (g). 
 291. Id. § 1401(h). 
 292. Id. § 1409(a)(1). 
 293. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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stance regarding parentage by deliberately removing the only reference to 
“blood” made in the context of jus sanguinis citizenship transmission. 
If Congress chooses to enact the second amendment, it will first need to 
define “parent-child relationship” under section 101(c), which currently does 
not do so.294  Drawing once again from the 2017 UPA, the definition should 
read similar to the following:  “the term ‘parent-child relationship’ means the 
legal relationship that is formed when a child is born, naturally or through 
assisted reproductive technology, to an individual who, at the time of birth, 
demonstrates an intent to be legally bound as a parent of the child.” 
B.  Collaborative Judicial Action and State Law Reform 
Until Congress amends the INA, the DOS will almost certainly continue 
to reject the parent-child relationship between children and their intended 
same-sex parents.  The parents, in turn, will have to find an alternative way 
to circumvent the effects of the DOS’s policy.  This alternative is available 
in the form of judicial action.  Courts are key players295 in counteracting the 
DOS’s policy since, upon entering a courtroom, the authority to interpret the 
INA shifts from the executive to the judiciary.296  As such, parents must seek 
redress in courtrooms, following a trajectory similar to the four families 
referenced in this Note. 
In doing so, parents must rely on a twofold argument:  (1) the Manual is 
not a binding authority and (2) courts should abandon DOS’s biology-based 
interpretation of the INA.  While the first argument is based on Supreme 
Court precedent, the strength of the second argument lies heavily in the 
proactive reform of parentage laws by state legislatures. 
1.  Nonbinding Nature of the Manual 
Despite the DOS’s seemingly dominating authority to interpret the INA, 
the DOS’s interpretation is not, in fact, binding.297  The DOS’s policy is 
codified in the Manual, which is an agency manual that was neither subjected 
to notice-and-comment rulemaking nor created following formal 
 
 294. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c). 
 295. The role of courts in counteracting the effects of the DOS’s interpretation cannot be 
understated.  The Scales court, for example, opined that the government relies on the Manual 
as a defense strategy because it had very few alternatives. Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1165 
(9th Cir. 2000).  An increased volume of judicial opinions on the subject would provide both 
parties with more authority to rely on in arguing their cases. See id.  The Ninth and Second 
Circuit precedents are particularly significant because, by opposing the norm, they are drawing 
attention to discrepancies in practice.  In Obergefell, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
part because there was a disagreement among courts that caused “impermissible geographic 
variation in the meaning of federal law.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015). 
 296. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
 297. Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 187 n.4 (2d Cir. 2018); Scales, 232 F.3d at 1166; 
Cyrus D. Mehta & Sophia Genovese, The Effects of ‘America First Foreign Policy’ and ‘Buy 
American Hire American’ on the Foreign Affairs Manual, 22 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1247, 
1256 (2017) (“FAM does not have the force of a statute or a regulation.  It is sub-regulatory 
guidance and is not binding.”). 
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adjudication.298  The interpretation found in the Manual therefore lacks the 
force of law299 and is not entitled to deference under Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,300 which would have required a court to 
give effect to what it found to be a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute.301 
Instead, the Manual is subject to the weaker deference302 recognized in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.303  Under Skidmore, the Manual is not “controlling 
upon the courts by reason of [its] authority.”304  Instead, the Manual is 
“entitled to respect” only if it has the “power to persuade.”305  Based on the 
discussion in Part II, parents have a very strong argument that the Manual is 
not persuasive and therefore does not have a binding effect.306  That being 
the case, reliance on the judiciary is critical for parents because it provides 
them with an opportunity to argue their case before an authority that is not 
bound by the DOS’s interpretation. 
2.  State Parentage Law as a Guide to Alternative Interpretation of the INA 
Federal courts often rely on state laws in interpreting ambiguous federal 
statutory language.307  In the context of the INA, this often includes 
interpreting ambiguous domestic relations terms, as illustrated by the courts 
 
 298. Scales, 232 F.3d at 1166; Titshaw, supra note 66, at 102–03. 
 299. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that the 
interpretation found in an agency opinion letter issued without formal adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking lacks the force of law, much like interpretations contained in similar 
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines); see also Moore v. Apfel, 
216 F.3d 864, 869 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (refusing to give Chevron deference to the Social 
Security Administration’s internal agency manual). 
 300. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 301. See id. at 842–44.  This Note holds that even if Chevron were applicable, Chevron 
deference would still not be granted since the DOS’s interpretation of the INA is not 
reasonable, as argued in Part II. 
 302. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (holding that the interpretation found in an agency 
opinion letter issued without formal adjudication or notice-and-comment is entitled to only 
Skidmore deference). 
 303. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 304. See id. at 140. 
 305. Id. 
 306. See supra Part II; see also Higdon, supra note 42, at 155 (arguing that “[g]iven then 
the way in which Congress crafted the statutes at issue, for the State Department to define ‘out 
of wedlock’ in a way that contravenes the ordinary meaning of the phrase is both unreasonable 
and impermissible”). 
 307. See, e.g., Huyen V. Nguyen v. Holder, 743 F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 2014) (relying on 
New York law to define incest); Garcia v. USICE (Dep’t of Homeland Sec.), 669 F.3d 91, 95 
(2d Cir. 2011) (relying on New York law to define legal custody); Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 
415, 423–24, 426 (5th Cir. 2001) (relying on Alabama, Delaware, Minnesota, and Nebraska 
state laws to define legal separation); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that while terms in a federal statute must take their meaning from federal law, federal 
law can look to state law, or even foreign law, for a rule of decision); Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 
432, 436 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that federal courts can turn to state law in defining good 
moral character for naturalization purposes). 
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of Scales,308 Solis-Espinoza,309 and Jaen.310  For this reason, state 
legislatures play a crucial role in strengthening parents’ second argument that 
courts should abandon the DOS’s biology-based interpretation of parentage 
in favor of an intent-based reading.  By proactively adopting laws that 
recognize intent-based parentage, state legislatures can provide courts with 
guidance as to an alternative way to interpret the INA.311 
Efforts are already underway to help state legislatures achieve this goal.312  
The 2017 UPA is a prime example.  As discussed in Part II.B, the 2017 UPA 
definition of parentage stands in stark contrast to the DOS’s interpretation.  
Unlike the DOS, the 2017 UPA considers intent, not biology, to be 
determinative in establishing a parent-child relationship.313  Courts 
interpreting the ambiguous parentage requirements of INA sections 301 and 
309 pursuant to the 2017 UPA will inevitably find that a parent-child 
relationship exists between same-sex parents and their foreign-born ART 
children, even if they lack a biological connection.314 
To enable courts to reach this conclusion, state legislatures must adopt the 
2017 UPA, or a version of it.315  Parents, in turn, must rely on the UPA-
inspired state parentage laws while constructing their arguments.  In doing 
so, they should rely not only on UPA articles 7 and 8, which directly address 
intended ART parents,316 but also on UPA section 613, which provides 
specific factors to consider in determining parentage.317  These factors 
include “the length of time during which each individual assumed the role of 
 
 308. Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2000) (referring to Washington state 
law’s presumption of parentage based on marriage). 
 309. Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (relying on 
California state law to determine whether a parent-child relationship exists). 
 310. Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that New York state 
law could be considered in determining parentage). 
 311. See Joslin, supra note 262, at 591 (arguing that “legislatures are well situated to 
proactively reform their parentage statutes to address these sex- and sexual-orientation-based 
distinctions”). 
 312. Id. 
 313. See supra notes 262–71 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra text accompanying note 268. 
 315. Currently, the 2017 UPA has been enacted by three states:  California, Vermont, and 
Washington. Parentage Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://my.uniformlaws.org/ 
committees/community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f 
[https://perma.cc/NC42-RJ2W] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  It is not a coincidence that either 
the Ninth or the Second Circuit has jurisdiction over these states. See About U.S. Federal 
Courts, FED. B. ASS’N, http://www.fedbar.org/Public-Messaging/About-US-Federal-
Courts_1.aspx [https://perma.cc/P2BJ-8WTV] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  History indicates 
that states will continue to adopt at least a version of the 2017 UPA.  When the first version 
of the UPA was presented in 1973, its provisions seeking to eliminate the status of 
“illegitimate” children seemed a drastic change. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2002).  However, the 1973 UPA was nevertheless promulgated, in part due to 
recent Supreme Court decisions of the time, which invalidated laws disadvantaging 
illegitimate children. Id.  Today, Windsor, Obergefell, and Pavan provide the same impetus 
to states who may find intent-based parentage to be a substantial amendment to their laws. 
 316. UPA 2017 arts. 7–8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 317. Id. § 613. 
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parent of the child,”318 “the nature of the relationship between the child and 
each individual,”319 and “the harm to the child if the relationship between the 
child and each individual is not recognized.”320 
Such collaboration between plaintiffs, federal courts, and state legislatures 
may protect same-sex families and their ART children by allowing courts to 
circumvent the effects of the DOS’s interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
Developments in ART have shattered preconceptions of what an “average” 
American family looks like.  ART has also given same-sex couples an 
alternative to adoption in expanding their families.  Indeed, today many 
same-sex parents like the Dvash-Bankses, Zaccari-Blixts, Mize-Greggs, and 
Kivitis are the proud parents of ART children.  However, the same families 
are suffering due to the DOS’s interpretation of the INA. 
Pursuant to the DOS’s interpretation, U.S. citizen parents can convey 
citizenship to their ART child only if they can establish a biological 
connection with the child.  This is often difficult for same-sex ART parents, 
at least one of whom will always lack a biological connection with their child.  
Further, even if the U.S. citizen parent can accomplish this first step, they 
must additionally satisfy the strict citizenship requirements of INA section 
309, which governs children born out of wedlock.  This is because, with one 
narrow exception, the DOS considers ART children of all married same-sex 
couples as categorically born out of wedlock. 
The DOS’s biology-based interpretation of parentage is constitutionally 
suspect under the recent Supreme Court decisions of Obergefell, Windsor, 
and Pavan.  The manner in which the DOS utterly disregards intent to 
become a parent in its interpretation is also unjustifiable.  In order to protect 
same-sex parents and their ART children, change is necessary.  While the 
most efficient solution is for Congress to amend the INA in recognition of 
intent-based parentage, it is also crucial for federal courts and state 
legislatures to collaborate to strengthen the claims of parents.  It is only by 
doing so that the “new average” American family can be protected. 
 
 318. Id. § 613(a)(2). 
 319. Id. § 613(a)(3). 
 320. Id. § 613(a)(4). 
